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CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND JOINT DEVELOPMENT: A
PRAGMATIC SOLUTION TO THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The South China Sea contains a collection of tiny islands
known as the Spratlys, which are the subject of a sovereignty
dispute between China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Brunei (claimants).' Following World War II, the Spratlys
remained largely unnoticed, except for a small Chinese garrison
stationed there,2 and China's and Vietnam's periodic declarations
of sovereignty over the Spratlys.3  This post World War II
tranquility in the Spratlys ended abruptly in the mid-1970s when oil
was discovered in the South China Sea. Thereafter, the Philip-
pines, Malaysia, and Brunei all declared sovereignty over the
Spratlys in an apparent attempt to claim the South China Sea oil
deposits, while most of the claimants since then have seized
1. Lee G. Cordner, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea, 25 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 61, 62-68 (1994). Although Indonesia has made no Spratly claim, its
Natuna gas field was depicted within Chinese territory on a 1992 official Chinese map of
the South China Sea. Chinese Bureaucrats Draw the Line in South China Sea, PETROLEUM
ECONOMIST, July 1995, at 16. This Comment refers to "Spratly Islands," although they are
known as "Truong Sa Islands" in Vietnam, "Nansha Islands" in China, and "Kalayaan
Islands" in the Philippines. Ted L. McDorman, The South China Sea Islands Dispute in the
1990's-A New Multilateral Process and Continuing Friction, 8 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL
L. 263, 264 n.5 (1993). This Comment does not distinguish between the claims of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan because both governments claim the
Spratlys as Chinese territory. The "Spratly" name comes from the British whaling captain
Spratly, who charted the islands in the 1880s. Teh-Kuang Chang, China's Claim of
Sovereignty Over Spratly and Parcel Islands: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 23 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 399, 400 n.8 (1991).
2. The only post World War II occupation of the Spratlys prior to the 1970s had been
China's garrison on Taiping Island, which was established in 1946. Michael Bennett, The
People's Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute,
28 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 425, 438 (1992).
3. Zhiguo Gao, The South China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation?, 25 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 345 (1994). Vietnam made its first Spratly claim at the 1951 Allied-Japan
Peace Conference in San Francisco. Cordner, supra note 1, at 65. China (PRC) protested
Vietnam's assertion, but was not represented at the conference. Id.
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territory and granted rights in the area.4 The claimants' rampant
unilateral activity has made the Spratly dispute one of the most
visible issues in South East Asia today.'
The claimants will likely resolve the Spratly sovereignty
dispute peacefully under some form of international agreement.
6
The claimants have enough common interests that such an agree-
ment should be relatively easy to craft. Because recent statements
by the claimants signal a commitment to negotiate under interna-
4. In 1995, the Spratlys were occupied as follows: China occupied 8 islands (PRC 7
and Taiwan 1), Vietnam occupied 23 islands, the Philippines occupied 8 islands, and
Malaysia occupied 3 islands. Bruce Blanche & Jean Blanche, Oil and Regional Stability in
the South China Sea, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV., Nov. 1, 1995, at 511. The Philippines,
Malaysia, and Brunei first claimed the Spratlys in 1978, 1979, and 1988, respectively.
Cordner, supra note 1, at 66-68. On May 8, 1992, China granted a concession to the U.S.
Crestone Energy Company to explore Vietnamese-claimed areas. Gao, supra note 3, at
349. In April 1994, Vietnam signed contracts with Mobil Oil for exploration in Chinese-
claimed areas. Spratly Islands: China Likely to Continue Claiming Territory, STRAITS
TIMES (Singapore), Mar. 25, 1995, at 34. In February 1995, the Philippines discovered
prefabricated Chinese structures on Mischief Reef, an area claimed by the Philippines.
Abby Tan, Spratly Tussle Eases as China Starts to Talk, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
16, 1995. China states that the Mischief Reef structures are shelter for fishermen. Rene
Pastor, Manila, Beijing Agree on Spratly Code of Conduct, Reuters World Service, Aug.
10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Facilities on Nansha Islands
are for Protection of Fishermen, Xinhua News Agency, Apr. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS,
World Library, XINHUA File.
5. Gao, supra note 3, at 346. The Spratly issue has been raised at nearly every recent
international conference concerning South East Asia, such as the 28th Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial Meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei on July
31, 1995 (July 1995 ASEAN Meeting) and the 1995 World Conference on Women in
Beijing. Cormentary: Bright Future for Sino-Asean Ties, Xinhua News Agency, Aug. 2,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, XINHUA File; NPC Chairman Meets Philippine
Senator, Xinhua News Agency, Sept. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, XINHUA
File.
6. Notwithstanding the claimants' diatribes and skirmishes, the Spratly dispute, when
viewed from a larger perspective, is clearly just a dispute among friends. Trade and
political relations between the claimants are strong and growing. For example, bilateral
trade between China and Vietnam increased 34.1% in 1994. Chinese, Vietnamese Foreign
Ministers Hold Talks in Beijing, Xinhua News Agency, May 17, 1995, available in LEXIS,
World Library, XINHUA File. Predictions of a violent outcome to the Spratly dispute
overemphasize the claimants' rhetoric. Asian countries often use heated rhetoric for
domestic political purposes while carefully preserving the underlying relationships. A
recent example of this phenomenon was China's military exercises near Taiwan. Although
China's and Taiwan's leaders publicly denounced each other during this incident, bilateral
trade was hardly affected and the parties upgraded their relationship immediately after the
incident. Seth Faison, China Proposes Effort to Improve Taiwan Relations, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 25, 1996, at Al.
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tional law,7 this dispute provides a perfect opportunity to establish
not only a useful international law precedent, but also to help
legitimize international law itself among the non-Western coun-
tries.
8
Although some of the claimants are willing to shelve the
sovereignty issue and proceed with joint development, 9 this
Comment argues that all of the claimants will benefit more by
promptly settling the sovereignty dispute. This Comment explores
some legal and practical considerations and concludes that the ideal
solution is for the other claimants to concede sovereignty to China
in exchange for an agreement to share the Spratlys' resources. Part
II provides an overview of the Spratlys' value and the various
claimants' positions. Part III evaluates each of the claimants'
positions under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) ° and suggests that China possesses the strongest
7. Historically, China insisted on a series of bilateral negotiations between China and
each of the other claimants. This position was understandably disagreeable to the other
claimants because of China's disproportionate bargaining power and the ambiguity of the
applicable law. China's current position is more palatable to the other claimants because
it calls for multilateral negotiations conducted under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. See infra note 10. China first announced this concession at the July 1995
ASEAN Meeting where Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen declared that China was
willing to resolve the Spratly "disputes through peaceful means in accordance with
principles defined in recognized international law ... including the UN Convention on
the .. . Law of the Sea." Commentary: Bright Future for Sino-Asean Ties, supra note 5.
The members of ASEAN are Brunei. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam. Kent E. Calder, Asia's Empty Tank, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr.
1996, at 55 n.1. Chinese Premier Li Peng recently reiterated China's willingness to
negotiate a Spratly settlement under international law during bilateral talks with Philippine
President Fidel Ramos in Tokyo on March 2, 1996. China-Readiness to Negotiate on
Spratlys Reiterated, Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, Mar. 5, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
8. Nearly all of the Asian countries' early experiences with international law have
been negative. For example, several Western countries imposed treaties on China that
forced China to pay reparations for wars started by Western powers, concede territory, and
submit to extraterritorial application of Western law in China. See generally JOHN K.
FAIRBANK, THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION 1800-1985 (1987). The successful
application of international law to the Spratly dispute would demonstrate to Asian
countries that modem international law may be used to their advantage.
9. For example, at the July 1995 ASEAN Meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen stated that "the [Spratly] disputes should be shelved and efforts should be made
for joint development." Qian on China's Stand over Nansha Islands, Xinhua News Agency,
July 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, XINHUA File.
10. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in THE LAW OF THE SEA (1983) [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
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legal claim. Part IV of this Comment explains how China's
growing military power, China's increasing demand for resources,
and China's current amenability to compromise, all contribute to
the need for an expedited resolution giving China sovereignty.
Finally, Part V demonstrates that the claimants would likely adhere
to a Spratly settlement agreement because such an agreement
would serve important interests of the claimants.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE
A. The Value of the Spratly Islands
1. Natural Resources
The Spratly Islands consist of hundreds of coral reefs,
submerged seamounts, and volcanic islets lying approximately
between Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia" (See Figure
1).12
11. McDorman, supra note 1, at 267. The exact scope and location of the Spratlys
have never been established. Id.
12. Id. fig. 1 at 267.
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By virtue of the exclusive economic zones granted under UNC-
LOS, sovereignty over the Spratlys nets exclusive control over its
surrounding resources. 3 Oil and natural gas are already being
extracted in areas adjacent to the Spratlys and preliminary
exploration in the Spratly area itself has revealed promising signs
of oil. 4 The desire to secure, the Spratlys' suspected oil wealth
undoubtedly explains much of the claimants' enthusiasm for Spratly
sovereignty. 5
While large oil deposits remain speculative, fish has tradition-
ally been a valuable natural resource in the Spratlys.16  The
Spratlys are among the richest fishing grounds in the world 7 that
will increase in value as Asia's already large population reaches
staggering proportions in the next century. 8 Currently, experts
value the annual yellowfin tuna harvest in the southern part of the
Spratlys alone at fifty million U.S. dollars. 9 The abundance of
fish and the potential oil deposits virtually guarantee that sover-
eignty over the Spratlys will yield impressive natural resource
wealth.
2. Strategic Value
In addition to economic value, control over the Spratlys may
be strategically significant to the claimants. 2° The Spratly area
straddles major international shipping lanes linking the Indian and
Pacific Oceans21 while the sea surrounding the Spratlys is shallow
and contains numerous reefs and other hazardous submarine
13. UNCLOr articles 57 and 121 allow an island sovereign to claim the resources in
a 200 nautical mile radius of sea and seabed around the island. UNCLOS, supra note 10,
arts. 57, 121.
14. Since 1950, 29 oil fields and 4 gas fields have been developed in the South China
Sea. Gao, supra note 3, at 349. Analysts predict that ten billion barrels of "oil equivalent"
(75% gas) will be recovered from South East Asia in the next decade. Blanche & Blanche,
supra note 4.
15. Gao, supra note 3, at 345.
16. McDorman, supra note 1, at 268.
17. David Jenkins, Philippines: Remote Islands a Flashpoint for Asia, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Mar. 25, 1995, at 29.
18. Michael Richardson, Water and Rice: Crisis Lies Ahead, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct.
26, 1995, at 4.
19. McDorman, supra note 1, at 268.
20. Id. at 267-68.
21. Cordner, supra note 1, at 61. The Spratlys are close to the sea lanes between
Singapore, Hong Kong, and China; furthermore, 70% of Japan's oil supply passes through
the Spratly area. Blanche & Blanche, supra note 4.
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features.22  These conditions suggest that any country occupying
the Spratlys would gain significant influence over international
shipping.23  Despite this strategic value, however, regulating
shipping is probably not a leading motivation of the Spratly
claimants. 24 Because the Spratly dispute arose suddenly in the
mid-1970s, coinciding with the South China Sea oil discoveries,




China claims all of the Spratly Islands and the surrounding
waters based on discovery and occupation.25 China (Taiwan) has
occupied Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratlys, since 194626
and has improved it with an airfield and anchorage.27 China
(PRC) has maintained troops on at least seven of the islands since
22. McDorman, supra note 1, at 267.
23. During World War II, a Japanese submarine base in the Spratlys menaced shipping
throughout the South China Sea. Id. China's 1992 territorial sea law requires foreign
warships to give prior notification and then receive China's permission to pass through
most of the South China Sea. Keith Eirinberg, The Growth and Role of the Chinese
Military, Prepared Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcom-
mittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Federal News Service, Oct. 12, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Although warships currently need no such
permission to traverse international waters, China claims its 1992 sea law will not affect
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. China's Sovereignty Over Nansha Not
Affecting Sailing of Foreign Vessels, Xinhua News Agency, May 18, 1995, available in
LEXIS, World Library, XINHUA File. UNCLOS does not restrict the passage of warships
in international waters. UNCLOS, supra note 10, arts. 17, 58.
24. Gao, supra note 3, at 346, 349. When the Vietnam War and Cold War caused
great tension in the South China Sea during the 1950s and 1960s, the claimants essentially
ignored the Spratlys. This suggests the strategic significance of the Spratlys is overstated.
Also, it is difficult to imagine what the claimants may gain by harassing international
shipping, considering the inevitable major power intervention.
25. Chang, supra note 1, at 403-13; Cordner, supra note 1, at 62. Since the founding
of the PRC in 1949, the former National People's Party ("Kuomintang") government of
China has only ruled Taiwan. The Kuomintang still considers itself the sole legitimate
government of China and claims the Spratlys as Chinese territory. In fact, the Kuomintang
military recently offered assistance to the PRC in defending China's Spratly claim. Blood
Thicker Than Politics, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 5, 1988, at 26.
26. Chinese troops first occupied Taiping Island in 1946. Bennett, supra note 2, at 437.
The Kuomintang abandoned Taiping Island in 1950 in fear of imminent Communist
Chinese invasion. Id. at 438. The PRC never invaded and the Kuomintang reoccupied
Taiping Island in 1956 in response to the Philippine "discovery" of the Spratlys. Id.
27. McDorman, supra note 1, at 269.
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1988 and has erected structures on some of them, 8 including a
naval airfield on Fiery Cross Reef.
2 9
According to Chinese records, China discovered the Spratlys
in the second century B.C.30 and began occupying and administer-
ing them as early as 111 B.C.31 For example, Admiral Yang Pu
led 100,000 sailors to the islands of the South China Sea during
China's Han dynasty (206 B.C. to A.D. 24).32 Later, during the
medieval period in Europe, the South China Sea was the principal
Chinese trade route to the West.33 The famous Ming dynasty
(A.D. 1368 to 1644) navigator Cheng Ho prepared detailed records
of his many voyages through the Spratly area in the 1400s.'
Recently excavated remains of Chinese Spratly settlements date to
the Tang (A.D. 618 to 907) and Song (A.D. 960 to 1272) dynas-
ties.35
More recent events further strengthen China's sovereignty
claim over the Spratlys. China declared its sovereignty over the
Spratlys in 1933 and 1934 in response to France's 1933 partial
occupation of the Spratlys. 36 Japan seized the Spratlys in 1939
and later relinquished sovereignty over the Spratlys to China in the
1952 China-Japan peace treaty.37 These modern acts manifesting
sovereignty, as well as ancient records and artifacts, provide
substantial support for China's discovery and occupation claim.
2. Vietnam
Like China, Vietnam claims the entire Spratly group based on
discovery and occupation. 31 Currently, Vietnam occupies twenty-
three of the Spratly Islands.3 9
Although failing to identify any basis for its claim, Vietnam
states that its Spratly ownership can be traced back to A.D.
28. Id.
29. Cordner, supra note 1, at 64.
30. Chang, supra note 1, at 403.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Cordner, supra note 1, at 62.
34. Chang, supra note 1, at 404.
35. Id.
36. Cordner, supra note 1, at 64.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 65.
39. Blanche & Blanche, supra note 4.
19961
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1650. 0' In addition, Vietnam maintains that it succeeded France's
1933 Spratly claim despite France's insistence that it never ceded
the Spratlys to Vietnam.41 Vietnam made its first modern decla-
ration of sovereignty over the Spratlys at the 1951 San Francisco
Peace Conference.4 2  Later in 1956, South Vietnam strongly
protested the Philippine explorer Tomas Cloma's alleged discovery
of the Spratlys.43 On September 14, 1958, North Vietnamese
Premier Pham Van Dong solemnly stated that Vietnam recognizes
and supports the Chinese Spratly claim." In 1975, however,
Vietnam reneged on its 1958 commitment to China and asserted its
own Spratly claim.45 Though Vietnam does appear to possess
some documentation of early Spratly contact, the modern Vietnam-
ese government's inconsistent positions regarding Spratly sover-
eignty weaken its current Spratly claim.
3. The Philippines
The Philippines claimed most of the Spratly area in 1978 based
on Philippine explorer Tomas Cloma's alleged 1947 discovery of
the Spratlys.4 6 This claim is based on the astonishing premise that
the Spratlys were unoccupied and unclaimed at the time of Cloma's
discovery and that a private individual may establish sovereignty
over territory.47 Currently, the Philippines maintains troops on
eight of the islands." The Philippine Spratly claim is invalid
under international law because the Philippine government derived
it from persons acting in an individual capacity.49
4. Malaysia
Malaysia claimed the southern portion of the Spratlys in 1979
40. Cordner, supra note 1, at 65.
41. Id. at 66.
42. Id. at 65.
43. Id.
44. Chang, supra note 1, at 417.
45. Cordner, supra note 1, at 66.
46. Cloma, a Philippine lawyer, allegedly discovered the Spratlys in 1947. Id. Cloma
publicized his discovery in 1956 and named it Kalayaan ("Freedomland"). Id. In May
1956, Cloma proclaimed himself "Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Kalayaan
State." Id. The Philippine government, through President Ferdinand Marcos, annexed the
Spratlys in 1978 under Cloma's 1974 cession of the Spratlys to the Philippines. Id. at 66-67.
47. Id. at 66.
48. Id. at 67.
49. Id.
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based on the Spratlys' geographic proximity to Malaysia.5 °
Currently, Malaysia occupies eight of the islands. Malaysia's
Spratly claim rests primarily on a misinterpretation of UNCLOS.
Under UNCLOS, a coastal state like Malaysia may control the
resources of its continental shelf but may not establish sovereignty
over any islands on the shelf.5 2  Malaysia, however, relies on
UNCLOS' continental shelf provision to claim the Spratly
Islands.53 In addition, customary international law disallows the
use of coastal state status to gain new territorial rights. 54 Because
Malaysia's current claim rests on improper applications of both
customary international law and UNCLOS, Malaysia's claim is of
dubious legality.
5. Brunei
Like Malaysia, Brunei claims the southern' portion of the
Spratlys based on their geographic proximity.5  But unlike the
other claimants, Brunei does not currently occupy any of the
islands.56 Brunei's claim suffers from similar legal deficiencies as
Malaysia's claim.
III. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
On November 16, 1994, UNCLOS entered into force, ushering
in a promising new era in international maritime law.57 UNCLOS
is the first comprehensive maritime legal regime governing the
exploitation and navigation of the world's oceans that most
countries played a role in drafting.58 The Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea promulgated UNCLOS in
December 1982 and most countries since then have signed it.59
50. Id.
51. Gao, supra note 3, at 348.
52. UNCLOS, supra note 10, arts. 76-77.
53. Cordner, supra note 1, at 67.
54. Jonathan I. Charney, Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the
Sea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 724, 729 (1995); Palmas, infra note 69, at 910.
55. Cordner, supra note 1, at 68.
56. McDorman, supra note 1, at 264.
57. Chamey, supra note 54, at 725.
58. Bernardo Zuleta, Introduction to THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 10, at xix, xix.
59. Charney, supra note 54, at 727 nn.10-11. Though all of the Spratly claimants signed
UNCLOS, only the governments of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam have ratified it.
China, NPC Adopts Sea Law, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 30, 1996, at 13, 13; Mark J.
Valencia et al., The Solution for the Spratly Islands Ought to Look Like This, INT'L
19961 873
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UNCLOS is especially relevant to the Spratly dispute because it
serves as the authoritative international law basis for an island
sovereign or a coastal state to control its surrounding resources.
UNCLOS provides two avenues through which the Spratly
claimants may potentially acquire the Spratlys' resources. One way
is to establish sovereignty over the actual islands.6 Alternatively,
the claimants may control the Spratlys' resources by virtue of their
status as coastal states.
61
Generally, UNCLOS requires mandatory third party adjudica-
tion where the parties fail to agree.62 UNCLOS, however, excepts
boundary disputes from the mandatory third party adjudication
requirement.63 This exception is convenient because the Spratly
claimants prefer an agreement without third party involvement and
such agreements have greater legitimacy in China.
64
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 10, 1995, Opinion Section. Because all of the interested parties
negotiated and signed UNCLOS, UNCLOS is the customary international law applicable
in the Spratly dispute notwithstanding Malaysia's and Brunei's failure to ratify it. See Ted
L. McDorman, The West Coast Salmon Dispute: A Canadian View of the Breakdown of
the 1985 Treaty and the Transit License Measure, 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 477,485
(1995).
60. UNCLOS article 121 grants the owner of an island an exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 121. UNCLOS provides that, in the EEZ, the state
has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploiting the natural resources. Id. art. 56.
61. Id. art. 76.
62. UNCLOS articles 281 and 286 require compulsory third party adjudication if the
parties fail to agree. Id. arts. 281, 286.
63. UNCLOS article 289 exempts boundary disputes from mandatory third party
adjudication. Id. arts. 289.
64. China would prefer settlement among the parties over third party adjudication for
several reasons. First, traditional Chinese philosophy frowns upon judicial determinations.
R.H. van Gulik, Preface to KUEI WAN-JUNG, T'ANG YIN PI SHIH [PARALLEL CASES FROM
UNDER THE PEAR-TREE] at vii, vii (R.H. van Gulik trans., 1956). The Chinese government
has always regarded official adjudication as something to be avoided. CHINESE
CIVILIZATION AND SOCIETY 126 (Patricia B. Ebrey ed., 1981). This view stems partly from
the Chinese government's stand throughout history of discouraging its citizens from seeking
legal redress because disputes were viewed as a failure of the moral leadership of the state.
Id.; Gulik, supra, at vii. Moreover, agreement among the parties is currently the preferred
method of dispute resolution in the PRC, where according to recent official statistics, party
agreement has solved 90% of all civil cases. Paul C. Yuan, China's Jurisdiction Over its
Offshore Petroleum Resources, 12 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 191, 203 (1983) [hereinafter
China's Jurisdiction]. Finally, China's nineteenth and early twentieth century experiences
with international law, such as the Unequal Treaties and the Opium War, continue to affect
its policy decisions today, explaining China's discomfort with terms imposed upon it by a
foreign tribunal. Bennett, supra note 2, at 443; Paul C. Yuan, The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea from a Chinese Perspective, 19 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 415, 424
(1984) [hereinafter Yuan, UNCLOS from a Chinese Perspective]. See generally FAIRBANK,
supra note 8.
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A. Control Based on Island Sovereignty
The most revolutionary and far-reaching provision of UNC-
LOS is article 121, which gives an island sovereign the exclusive
right to exploit the resources in a 200 nautical mile exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) around the island.65 Article 121 paragraph
3, however, limits the granting of EEZs to islands capable of
sustaining human habitation or economic life.' Although it is
unclear whether the Spratlys can sustain either, most commentators
agree that the terms "sustain human habitation" and "economic
life" should be interpreted generously as applied to the Spratlys.
67
1. Cases Decided Under International Adjudication
UNCLOS requires a country to establish sovereignty over an
island prior to claiming an EEZ around it. Rather than provide a
codified rule, UNCLOS states that sovereignty disputes shall be
resolved under pre-existing international law.' Insofar as UNC-
65. UNCLOS article 121 provides that "the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention." UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 121.
Article 2 provides "[t]he sovereignty of a ... [s]tate extends ... to ... the territorial sea,"
which article 3 defines as "not exceeding 12 nautical miles." Id. arts. 2-3. Article 33
defines the contiguous zone as not exceeding 24 miles from the territorial sea. Id. art. 33.
Article 57 provides the EEZ "shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from ... the
territorial sea." Id. art. 57. Article 76 defines the continental shelf as "extend[ing] beyond
the territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge
of the continental margin." Id. art 76.
66. UNCLOS article 121 paragraph 3 provides "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf." Id. art. 121, para. 3. A "rock," therefore, is only entitled to a default
12 nautical mile territorial sea.
67. UNCLOS fails to define the terms "rocks," "sustain human habitation," or
"[sustain] economic life." Some commentators have suggested that the language "sustain
human habitation" should be interpreted to include islands that import supplies. Jon M.
Van Dyke & Robert A. Brooks, Uninhabited Islands: Their Impact on the Ownership of
the Oceans' Resources, 12 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 265, 284 (1983). Similarly, "economic
life of their own" should be interpreted to mean use of the island to exploit its surrounding
resources. Charney, supra note 54, at 734. The largey of the Spratlys' islands, such as
Taiping Island, would not be considered "rocks" because they contain airfields and
anchorages. McDorman, supra note 1, at 269.
68. UNCLOS articles 74 and 83 provide that the EEZ and the continental shelf shall
be "effected ... [under] international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice." UNCLOS, supra note 10, arts. 74, 83. Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice states that disputes shall be decided in
accordance with international law, which is defined as follows:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
A----
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LOS incorporates only existing international law, UNCLOS offers
limited guidance in determining island sovereignty. This makes an
examination of the twentieth century international cases establish-
ing island sovereignty necessary to determine sovereignty issues.
International law provides two general rules for establishing
island sovereignty. First, discovery, occupation, and administration
establish sovereignty over inhabited islands. 69  Second, discovery
alone can establish sovereignty over uninhabited islands.70 These
fact intensive rules were developed in the Palmas and Clipperton
cases discussed below.
a. The Palmas Case
The 1928 Palmas case, decided by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at The Hague,7" involved a sovereignty dispute
between the United States and the Netherlands over an island off
the Philippine coast.7 2  The Palmas court held that the first
country to discover an island establishes only inchoate title which,
unless subsequently perfected by actual utilization, will be defeated
by another country's display of continuous occupation.73 The
Palmas court further ruled that proximity to an island is not a basis
for establishing sovereignty over it.74
The United States argued for sovereignty over Palmas based
on two theories. First, the United States claimed that it succeeded
Spain's title by discovery under the 1898 Treaty of Paris.75
Second, the United States claimed Palmas based on its proximity
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38 [hereinafter ICJ STATUTE].
69. Cordner, supra note 1, at 69. The Palmas case established the general rule for
perfecting sovereignty over an inhabited island. The Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.)
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867 (1928) [hereinafter Palmas].
70. The Clipperton case established the general rule for perfecting sovereignty over an
uninhabited island. Clipperton Island (Fr. v. Mex.) (Victor Emmanuel III 1931), reprinted
in 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932) [hereinafter Clipperton].
71. Palmas, supra note 69, at 870.
72. Id. at 884.
73. Inchoate title cannot prevail over the continuous and peaceful display of another
state's authority. Id.
74. "Contiguity... has no foundation in international law." Id. at 910.
75. Id. at 907. Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States under the 1898 Treaty
of Paris.
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to the Philippines. 76 The Palmas court, however, rejected both of
these arguments77 and awarded Palmas to the Netherlands based
on the Netherlands' "peaceful and continuous display of state
authority over the island., 78  The Palmas court reasoned that
although the Netherlands did not discover Palmas, it maintained
continuous settlements on it while Spain never utilized the
island. 79 The Palmas rule appears limited to inhabited islands.8"
The Palmas court's dismissal of the U.S. proximity argument
undermines Malaysia's and Brunei's Spratly claims because these
claims rest primarily on geographic proximity.8 The Palmas
court's rule on discovery and occupation applies only to China's
and Vietnam's Spratly claims because they are the only claimants
who rely on historic discovery and occupation.82
According to China's records, China discovered the Spratlys
2100 years ago during its Han dynasty,83 and China's Guandong
province was effectively administering the Spratlys by the Ming
dynasty (A.D. 1368 to 1644).' Archaeological evidence of
ancient Chinese occupation, such as remains of dwellings and
tombs, as well as artifacts like coins and porcelain, provide tangible
support for China's records.85 The Palmas court stated that "[i]t
76. Id.
77. The Palmas court rejected the U.S. Spanish succession argument because Spain
could not transfer more rights than it itself possessed. Id. at 879. Spain's inchoate title
over Palmas was unperfected because Spain never occupied Palmas; thus, Spain had no
valid title that could have been transferred to the United States. Id. at 879-80. The Palmas
court rejected the proximity argument with the following rule: "Nor is this principle of
contiguity admissible as a legal method of deciding questions of territorial sovereignty; for
it is wholly lacking in precision and would in its application lead to arbitrary results." Id.
at 893. "Contiguity... has no foundation in international law." Id. at 910.
78. Id. at 908.
79. Id. at 894-95.
80. Id. at 894.
81. Cordner, supra note 1, at 67-68.
82. Id. at 62, 65. Although the Philippines also relies on discovery and occupation to
claim the Spratlys, the Philippines rests its Spratly claim on succeeding an individual's
(Tomas Cloma) alleged title over the Spratlys. Id. at 66-67. Deriving sovereignty from an
individual not acting as a agent of a sovereign state was not addressed in either Palmas or
Clipperton probably because of the theory's obvious invalidity. Id. at 67. Because the
Philippines rests its claim on unrecognized legal principles, this Comment will not analyze
the Philippines' discovery claim under the either the Palmas or Clipperton rule.
83. Chang, supra note 1, at 409.
84. Id. at 404-05.
85. Id. at 410; Cordner, supra note 1, at 62. Song dynasty (A.D. 960 to 1272) porcelain
and Tang dynasty (A.D. 618 to 907) coins were found in the Spratlys in 1995. More
Chinese Relics Found in Nansha Islands, Xinhua News Agency, June 13, 1995, available in
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
is quite natural that the establishment of sovereignty may be the
outcome of a slow evolution, of a progressive intensification of
state control., 86  China's records track the Palmas formulation
quite accurately.
In contrast to China's ancient records, the oldest Vietnamese
record of contact with the Spratlys dates only to the 1600s.87 Not
only do China's records of utilization predate Vietnam's, China's
records also reflect continuity of Chinese occupation, which
perfects China's title by discovery under the Palmas rule. China's
perfected title would be unaffected by subsequent Vietnamese
contact with the Spratlys.
b. The Clipperton Case
Although the Palmas rule required actual occupation, the 1931
Clipperton case 88 held that discovery and declaration of sovereign-
ty may alone suffice to claim an uninhabited island.89 Clipperton
was a sovereignty dispute between France and Mexico over an
uninhabited guano mount in the Pacific Ocean.' Like the United
States in Palmas, Mexico's sovereignty claim rested on succeeding
Spain's title by discovery.91 The Clipperton court accepted the
theory that an uninhabited island could be claimed by discovery
alone.92 The court, however, rejected Mexico's claim because it
found Mexico's evidence of Spanish discovery unconvincing.93
Instead, the court accepted France's discovery claim, even though
a mere newspaper advertisement in 1858 supported it,94 and
awarded the island to France despite Mexico's later sovereignty
declaration in 1897.9' Because the Spratlys are arguably uninhab-
LEXIS, World Library, XINHUA File.
86. Palmas, supra note 69, at 908.
87. Cordner, supra note 1, at 65.
88. Clipperton, supra note 70.
89. The Clipperton court held that taking possession of an island generally requires a
series of acts to occupy the island and to exercise exclusive authority over the island. Id.
at 393. For completely uninhabited islands, however, sovereignty is established the first
moment the occupying state makes its appearance. Id. at 394.
90. Id. at 392.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 394.
93. Id. at 392-93.
94. France placed an advertisement in the December 8, 1858 edition of the Honolulu
newspaper, The Polynesian, proclaiming its sovereignty over Clipperton Island. Id. at 391.
95. Id. at 392.
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ited,96 the Clipperton rule for uninhabited islands could apply in
the Spratly dispute.
China's documented two thousand year old discovery of the
Spratlys predates Vietnam's earliest record of Spratly contact by
over a millennium.97 In addition, China's and Vietnam's first
modern declarations of Spratly sovereignty occurred in 1933 and
1951 respectively.98 China's combination of discovery and earlier
modern sovereignty declaration perfects China's Spratly claim
under Clipperton's first-to-discover rule.
c. Summary of the Cases
Palmas and Clipperton created an international law distinc-
tion between inhabited and uninhabited islands that is unimportant
as applied to the Spratly dispute. The relative strengths of the
Spratly claimants' positions are identical under either classification
of the Spratlys. Regardless of whether the Spratlys are deemed
inhabited or uninhabited, China clearly possesses the strongest
sovereignty claim.
2. Relevant Anglo-American Legal Theories
UNCLOS requires application of pre-existing international law
to settle sovereignty disputes." Under UNCLOS, the sources of
international law include treaties and cases decided by international
tribunals, as well as "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.'' 1 °  Because of the widespread acceptance of
Anglo-American law, the Spratly dispute should be analyzed under
some Anglo-American legal principles that may prove relevant in
a future Spratly settlement. This section focuses on three such
principles-notice, estoppel, and bargaining power-in order to
illustrate some potential issues.
a. Notice
A fundamental concept of Anglo-American law is that one
may not establish title to property with knowledge that the
96. Van Dyke & Brooks, supra note 67, at 268.
97. Chang, supra note 1, at 409; Cordner, supra note 1, at 65.
98. In 1933 and 1934, China protested France's July 25, 1933 claim of sovereignty over
part of the Spratlys. Cordner, supra note 1, at 64. Vietnam first asserted sovereignty over
the Spratlys at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951. Id. at 65.
99. UNCLOS, supra note 10, arts. 74, 83.
100. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 38.
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property already belongs to another. Three of the Spratly
claimants, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, failed to assert
any Spratly claims until the late 1970s or 1980s. 01' Because China
and Vietnam have periodically declared sovereignty over the
Spratlys since the early 1950s,"° the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Brunei had ample notice that the Spratlys already belonged to
others. The Clipperton court found that France's newspaper
advertisement gave sufficient notice to defeat Mexico's subsequent
sovereignty declaration. 3 The public announcements by China
and Vietnam at international forums are certainly more obvious
than a mere newspaper advertisement. Therefore, the Philippines',
Malaysia's, and Brunei's knowledge should preclude them from
asserting a valid Spratly claim.
b. Estoppel
Another principle of Anglo-American law is the equitable
doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel prohibits a party from retracting a
representation if the other party has detrimentally relied on it."
In 1958, North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong solemnly
recognized China's Spratly claim. 05 After the fall of Saigon in
1975, however, the Vietnamese government reversed its long-
standing position and asserted its own Spratly claim. 1°6 China
may argue that it had comiitted resources to develop the Spratlys
in reliance on Vietnam's 1958 representation that China's Spratly
claim was valid. Therefore, Vietnam should be estopped from
denying the validity of China's Spratly claim. Even if China is
unable to show that it detrimentally relied on Vietnam's 1958
representation, Vietnam's prior representation certainly diminishes
its current historic claim over the Spratlys.
c. Bargaining Power
Contemporary Anglo-American law looks unfavorably at
imbalanced agreements where the parties negotiated under unequal
bargaining positions. Many countries, including China, have
101. Cordner, supra note 1, at 66-68.
102. Id. at 67.
103. Clipperton, supra note 70, at 391.
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
105. Cordner, supra note 1, at 66.
106. Id.
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declared such agreements invalid due to the parties' unequal
bargaining strength. °7 Because China has agreed to multilateral
negotiations in the Spratly dispute,"8 even a facially imbalanced
agreement may not be attacked on grounds of unequal bargaining
power because the combined bargaining strength of the other
claimants is an adequate balance to China's power.
3. Summary of the Island Sovereignty Analysis
Under UNCLOS article 121, sovereignty must first be deter-
mined before the Spratlys' resources may be secured. Cases such
as Palmas and Clipperton have established sovereignty rules based
on discovery, occupation, and administration. Some commentators
suggest that none of the Spratly claimants have thus far presented
sufficient indicia of discovery, occupation, or administration that
would meet contemporary legal standards."
Even if none of the Spratly claimants' evidence is comprehen-
sive enough to satisfy all of the commentators, China's evidence is
certainly the strongest compared to the other claimants' evidence.
As a result, China should prevail under a relative standard for
determining island sovereignty. International law is unclear on
whether this standard is relative or absolute.t0 If all of the
claimants are unable to meet an arbitrary absolute standard,
however, the absolute standard suggests the illogical result that
none of the claimants are entitled to sovereignty. Therefore, the
relative standard appears correct.
The preceding analysis on establishing island sovereignty may
prove irrelevant to the Spratly dispute because Spratly sovereignty
does not automatically yield an EEZ. Whether the Spratlys are
entitled to an EEZ turns on the interpretation of article 121
paragraph 3's limitation that UNCLOS only confers control of
maritime resources to owners of islands capable of sustaining
human habitation or economic life."' Because experts disagree
on the definition of sustaining human habitation and economic
life," 2 the country that eventually gains Spratly sovereignty may
not receive exclusive control over their surrounding resources. If
107. Yuan, UNCLOS from a Chinese Perspective, supra note 64, at 424.
108. Commentary: Bright Future for Sino-Asean Ties, supra note 5.
109. Cordner, supra note 1, at 69.
110. Charney, supra note 54, at 728.
111. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 121.
112. Charney, supra note 54, at 734.
1996]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
this happens, the claimants may still acquire the Spratlys' resources
under UNCLOS based on their status as coastal states.
B. Control Based on Coastal State Status
In addition to islands, UNCLOS also grants a 200 nautical mile
EEZ to coastal states.113 For non-living resources, UNCLOS ex-
tends the coastal state's control beyond the 200 nautical mile EEZ
limit to the edge of its continental shelf, provided the shelf is a
natural prolongation of the coastal state's land territory.114 The
advantage of using coastal state status to acquire resource rights is
that it avoids the difficulties of establishing sovereignty over
islands. Nonetheless, acquiring resource rights using coastal state
status may be problematic as well.
The difficulty of the coastal state analysis as applied to the
Spratly dispute is the geological situation of the South China Sea.
Because the claimants exist opposite and adjacent to each other,
their potential EEZs and continental shelf boundaries overlap.
Fortunately, a geological analysis is not determinative in delimiting
borders where, as in the Spratly situation, the states have opposite
or adjacent coasts. 5
In a Spratly-type situation, the contemporary trend seems to
rely more on factors such as coastal geography, equidistance, and
access to currently exploited resources to set maritime bound-
aries."6 A modern court would probably measure the claimants'
coastlines, develop median lines through the South China Sea, and
then apply equitable considerations in order to arrive at boundaries
for the claimants."1 7 Under these principles, and disregarding the
presence of the Spratlys themselves, China, Vietnam, and the
Philippines would probably gain equal shares of the Spratly
area,"8 Malaysia would receive a smaller share, and Brunei
113. UNCLOS article 56 grants an EEZ to a coastal state, and article 57 limits the EEZ
to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS, supra note 10, arts. 56-57.
114. Id. arts. 56, 76.
115. The last paragraph of article 76 provides: "The provisions of this article are without
prejudice to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with
opposite or adjacent coasts." Id. art. 76.
116. Chamey, supra note 54, at 740.
117. Valencia et al., supra note 59. Like the issue of island sovereignty, UNCLOS
article 83 requires the continental shelf to be delimited on the basis of existing international
law. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 83.
118. Valencia et al., supra note 59.
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would get a narrow corridor." 9
Claiming the Spratlys' resources based on the claimants'
proximity has a certain allure because each of the claimants would
probably receive a share. This solution, however, is applicable only
if the Spratlys are deemed to be mere "rocks" under UNC-
LOS.12° If the Spratlys are determined to be islands under
UNCLOS, the Spratlys themselves would generate EEZs that may
not be diminished by the presence of coastal states.'21 Because
the Spratlys probably are islands under UNCLOS 122 and China
has the strongest sovereignty claim, China would likely receive the
largest share, even under the coastal state analysis.
IV. AN EXPEDITED JOINT DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT WITH
CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY
Recent statements by top Chinese officials reflect the position
that China is willing to ignore the sovereignty issue temporarily in
order to proceed with joint development."2 Despite this attrac-
tive offer, all of the Spratly claimants have more to gain by a
prompt settlement of the sovereignty dispute. To the extent that
Palmas and Clipperton remain good law, China possesses the
strongest Spratly sovereignty claim. China's claim will not weaken
with the passage of time so there is little reason for the other
claimants to delay a sovereignty determination. The legal consider-
ation that China possesses the strongest sovereignty claim com-
bined with practical considerations, such as China's growing
military power, China's increasing demand for resources, and
China's current amenability to compromise in exchange for
sovereignty, all indicate that the Spratly dispute should be resolved
under an expedited joint development agreement giving China
sovereignty. Existing Asian joint development projects, as well as
UNCLOS provisions, may provide useful guidance in shaping a
workable Spratly joint development agreement.
Notwithstanding China's offer to shelve the sovereignty issue,
the claimants should resolve the sovereignty dispute promptly. If
119. Id.
120. UNCLOS article 121 defines a "rock" as a feature not able to sustain human
habitation or economic life. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 121.
121. Charney, supra note 54, at 729.
122. See supra text accompanying note 67.
123. Qian on China's Stand over Nansha Islands, supra note 9.
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the claimants delay, they may forfeit their opportunity to settle
under acceptable terms. Currently, China probably harbors neither
the desire nor the ability to take the Spratlys by force. This
situation, however, could change in the next century. China's
impressive economic growth in the last decade will likely continue
into the foreseeable future.24  Undoubtedly, this economic
growth will also fuel China's military modernization, which can
only erode the other claimants' bargaining positions.
Coinciding with increased Chinese military power in the next
century will be increased Chinese demand for resources. China
already bears one-fifth of the world's population whose future
growth will further strain China's limited food capacity. Also,
China's rapidly modernizing economy poses ever increasing
demands for energy to satisfy its citizens' appetites for automobiles,
appliances, and other necessities of modern life. The Spratlys, with
their proven fish stocks and potential oil reserves, will become an
increasingly inviting target for a resurgent and resource-starved
China, especially if potential oil reserves are confirmed. The
prospect of a hungry yet powerful twenty-first century China
should further urge the claimants not to delay a resolution to the
Spratly dispute.
Moreover, the longer the sovereignty dispute remains
outstanding, the more opportunities for hostile incidents among the
claimants to occur.125 Such incidents may lead to serious conflicts
if, for example, a major power intervenes to safeguard international
shipping lanes. This constant danger of violent conflict in the
South China Sea requires a swift resolution of the Spratly dispute.
An additional factor adding urgency to resolving the Spratly
dispute is China's current political situation. A pressing concern
among China's leaders is the impending leadership transition within
124. China's economy has grown at an average of nine percent per year since 1979.
Chinese Bureaucrats Draw the Line in South China Sea, supra note 1.
125. On March 14, 1988, Vietnamese and Chinese ships clashed in the Spratly area,
leaving two Vietnamese ships destroyed. The World, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1988, at 2.
Both countries accused the other of precipitating the incident. Id. In May 1995, Philippine
soldiers destroyed some Chinese territory markers in the Spratlys. Abby Tan, Manila's
Plan to Build Lighthouses in Spratlys May Make China See Red, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 5, 1995; U.S. Voices Concern at Rising Tension in Spratlys, Reuters, June 15, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. In an even bolder move, the Philippine
government captured 62 Chinese fishermen in the Spratlys and detained 58 of them for 8
months and 4 of them for 10 months. Detained Chinese Fishermen Back Home, Xinhua
News Agency" Jan. 29, 1,996, available in LEXIS, World Library, XINHUA File.
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China.126  Securing Spratly sovereignty for China would be a
monumental prize for any aspiring Chinese paramount leader.
Current Chinese officials should be willing to make concessions to
the other claimants for the opportunity to take credit for reclaim-
ing high-profile disputed territory. In addition, recent statements
by top Chinese officials imply that China is willing to compromise
in exchange for recognition of China's Spratly sovereignty.
127
These factors place the other claimants in an excellent negotiating
position with China that may be unavailable later.
Another aspect of China's impending leadership transition is
that it probably precludes any settlement involving China relin-
quishing sovereignty. As previously mentioned, the coastal state
theory of border delimitation can possibly lead to partitioning the
Spratlys among the claimants.128  Spratly sovereignty, however,
probably cannot be divided because the Chinese government is
simply not in a position to relinquish any sovereignty. Because
China is now in a sensitive transition period as its aging leaders
step down, no element of the Chinese government can afford to
lose domestic legitimacy by relinquishing territory to foreign
powers.129  Even after the leadership transition, a new Chinese
government in the process of consolidating power would also be
unable to sacrifice domestic legitimacy by relinquishing sovereignty.
Unlike China, the other claimants probably face less obstacles
in relinquishing sovereignty over the Spratlys. Because most of the
other claimants showed no interest in the Spratlys until the
discovery of South China Sea oil, it is reasonable to assume that
these claimants' primary interest in the Spratlys is economic. This
126. Rone Tempest, Next Step, China's Power Game, Who Will Succeed Leader Deng
Xiaoping? Top Players Are Jockeying for Position, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1995, World
Report.
127. See Qian on China's Stand over Nansha Islands, supra note 9.
128. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 77.
129. China has no established mechanism for transferring power from one generation
to another. Tempest, supra note 126. The advanced age of most of China's current
leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, herald an imminent succession struggle. Id. It is
important for aspiring successors to secure military and popular support. Id. Any Chinese
official who relinquishes Spratly iovereignty will lose domestic credibility, especially
because the National People's Congress declared that the Spratlys were Chinese territory
in China's 1992 territorial sea law. Liyu Wang & Peter H. Pearse, The New Legal Regime
for China's Territorial Sea, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 431, 435. Also, Chinese Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen stated that "China, from time immemorial, [had] the indisputable
sovereignty of the Nansha islands." Qian on China's Stand over Nansha Islands, supra note
9. It would be difficult for Chinese leaders to retreat from such forceful declarations.
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makes a joint development agreement giving China sovereignty an
ideal solution because it would provide all of the claimants
significant economic benefits, deny nominal sovereignty only to
those claimants with little interest in sovereignty, and grant
sovereignty to China, which has a strong interest in sovereignty.
Many existing cases of joint resource development in disputed
areas may serve as a model for a Spratly settlement. In 1979, for
example, Thailand and Malaysia established a joint oil development
area in'the disputed Gulf of Thailand.13 ° Australia and Indonesia
established a joint development project in the disputed Timor Gap
in 1988.131 Malaysia and Thailand both have joint development
agreements with Vietnam.132 In these cases, the disputants
shelved the sovereignty issue and proceeded with joint develop-
ment.133 Nevertheless, these cases are useful examples of South
East Asian countries sharing resources in disputed areas.
The joint development and distribution of maritime resources
is a major underlying theme of UNCLOS.'3 4 UNCLOS states
that the resources of the seas are the common heritage of man-
kind.135 Because the EEZs and the continental shelves granted
under UNCLOS are so vast, UNCLOS necessarily contemplates
that countries possessing EEZs and continental shelves will share
their bounty. In fact, UNCLOS even requires resource sharing in
certain circumstances,136 indicating a possible role for UNCLOS
as the legal basis supporting a Spratly joint development agree-
ment.
In sum, an expedited joint development agreement providing
for Chinese sovereignty is the most practical solution to the Spratly
dispute. It would allow the other claimants to take advantage of
China's current weakness and impending leadership transition to
bargain for valuable concessions China would have little reason to
relinquish in the future. Also, China would benefit because it
could avoid a potentially unfavorable adjudication of the sovereign-
ty claim. In addition, examples of successful joint developnent in
130. McDorman, supra note 1, at 273.
131. Id.
132. Blanche & Blanche, supra note 4.
133. McDorman, supra note 1, at 273.
134. UNCLOS, supra note 10, pmbl.
135. Id.
136. UNCLOS article 82 provides: "[t]he coastal state shall make payments... [for] the
exploration of non living resources ... beyond 200 nautical miles." Id. art. 82.
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Asia already exist and UNCLOS provides a means of enforcing a
joint development agreement.
V. RELIABILITY OF A SPRATLY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Any international agreement, even one labeled "binding," is
by nature voluntary. This makes an international agreement's
reliability dependent on the parties' belief that it is in their
interests to adhere to it. A Spratly agreement would serve
important interests of all the claimants, and as a result, the
likelihood of compliance is high. Attaching additional agreements
between the claimants beyond the Spratly joint resource develop-
ment may even further strengthen a Spratly agreement. This
section proposes some possible terms for a Spratly joint develop-
ment agreement and analyzes the advantages to the claimants of
compliance with this agreement.
A. The Claimants' Interest in Adhering to a Spratly Agreement
The claimants other than China would have a strong interest
in adhering to a Spratly agreement because it could assist their
modernization efforts. A Spratly agreement would facilitate the
foreign investment and technology transfer needed to efficiently
exploit the Spratlys' resources. Such an agreement would also
result in a closer relationship with China that could only benefit
these claimants.
1. Need for Foreign Technology and Investment
All of the claimants are developing countries that could use
the Spratlys' natural resources to modernize.137 But because they
are developing countries, none have the requisite capital or
technology necessary to exploit these resources.138  As a result,
efficient exploitation of the Spratlys depends on attracting foreign
investment and technology transfer. Potential foreign investors are
unlikely to commit billions of dollars in joint ventures unless they
are convinced of the host country's rights to the resources.'39
137. None of the developing couritries of East Asia have any significant amount of
native petroleum. V.H. Krulak, Spratly Islands Have An Oily Allure, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Feb. 25, 1995, at B8. Thus, they must buy oil on the open market, which makes the
potential oil deposit under the Spratlys especially attractive because of its proximity. Id.
138. Bennett, supra note 2, at 433.
139. Id. Competing claims of sovereignty over the Spratly Islands threaten oil and gas
development in the area. Blanche & Blanche, supra note 4. "The continuing discord and
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Because none of the claimants have sufficient military strength to
offer a unilateral guaranty to foreign investors,"' the claimants
would be unable to maximize the Spratlys' economic bounty while
the issue of sovereignty remains contested.
2. Benefits of a Closer Relationship with China
Insofar as the issue of sovereignty is crucial to China, if the
other claimants concede sovereignty, China would almost certainly
reciprocate with valuable benefits for these claimants. Such
benefits could include greater access to the Chinese market, greater
access to advanced technology, and improved bargaining strength
with respect to the major powers.
a. Increased Access to the China Market
China's economy is currently the fastest growing major
economy in the world.14' With a population of over one billion
whose spending power is climbing at a breathtaking rate, improved
relations with China would be especially useful to the Spratly
claimants because many of them are major producers of consumer
goods that are highly sought after in China.1 2  If the claimants
gained trade concessions from China as part of a Spratly settle-
ment, the claimants would certainly have a strong economic
interest in abiding by the agreement.
b. Access to Technology Using Chinese Trade Clout
A consequence of China's immense economy is its great
bargaining power over foreign vendors. Western companies and
governments are properly reluctant to transfer technology that may
potentially erode their competitive advantage.'43 The Chinese
the threat of conflict now dominating the region are discouraging investors." Valencia et
al., supra note 59.
140. All the Spratly claimants have modest military capabilities. Gao, supra note 3, at
348. The recently publicized increase in regional arms buying activity consisted merely of
a few countries purchasing one or two squadrons of fighter aircraft or a few patrol boats.
Id.
141. Craig S. Smith, China's Growth Rate Slowed to 9.8% for 9 Months, Lowest Level
Since 1991, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1995, at A6.
142. Sid Astbury, Malaysia Surviving Growing Pains-So Far an 8-Year Economic
Miracle Generated a Consumer Boom. Now, the Government Walks Tightrope to Keep Hot
Economy from Overheating, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 24, 1995, at B5.
143. Jeff Cole et al., Orient Express: Boeing Flies into Flap over Technology Shift in
Dealings with China, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1995, at Al.
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market is so vast, however, that many Western companies have
willingly divulged technology to China as the price for admission
to the Chinese market.1" As part of a Spratly settlement, the
other claimants may negotiate for participation in Chinese joint
ventures with foreign companies. Such participation would give the
other claimants an important incentive to adhere to the Spratly
settlement because it could provide access to advanced technology
that these claimants would otherwise have difficulty obtaining.145
c. Greater Bargaining Strength Over Major Powers
All of the Spratly claimants other than China are small
developing countries existing in a world dominated by large
industrial powers. It is often difficult for countries such as these
Spratly claimants to prevail on their positions in international
negotiations. As part of a Spratly settlement, the other claimants
may obtain pledges of Chinese support for their positions on
various international issues, which will certainly enhance their
bargaining power on the world stage.
B. China's Interest in Adhering to a Spratly Agreement
An obvious concern of granting China sovereignty in a
resource sharing agreement is that China may simply abrogate the
agreement upon gaining sovereignty. This scenario is unlikely,
however, because China has strong interests in preserving its
credibility in South East Asia. Equally important is that China
currently lacks the military capability to unilaterally expropriate the
Spratlys' resources. These practical considerations indicate that
144. One example is General Motors' recent agreement to build an automobile design
institute in China in exchange for increased access to the Chinese automobile market.
General Motors Planning Research Center in China, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1995. Some
analysts speculate that China awarded this contract to General Motors over Ford because
General Motors was more willing to share technology. David Lawder, Ford May Move to
Back of Pack for Dominance in China, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 25, 1995, at C2.
145. To illustrate, China and South Korea formed a partnership to develop a
commercial airliner as a joint venture with Western aerospace companies. Jeff Cole,
Boeing Faces European Competition in Effort to Build Small Plane for Asia, WALL ST. J.,
May 8, 1995, at B2. The Western companies agreed to transfer technology because they
hoped to tap into China's immense aircraft market. Stanley Holmes, How Boeing Woos
Beijing, SEATTLE TIMES, May 26, 1996, at Al. Although the China-South Korea
partnership was eventually abandoned, it illustrates how a small country may access
advanced technology using China's trade clout. Craig S. Smith, China, South Korea Decide
to Abandon Aircraft Alliance, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1996, at A14.
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China would likely adhere to a Spratly agreement. 1 6
1. Benefits of a Closer Relationship with the Other Claimants
China stands to gain significant goodwill in South East Asia by
adhering to a Spratly settlement agreement. An obvious result of
this goodwill is that China could maintain or increase its access to
the fast-developing South East Asian markets. Also, the future
global economy will likely see ihcreased regional cooperation in the
form of trading blocks. This trend is already manifesting itself in
coalitions like the European Union and treaties like the North
American Free Trade Agreement. China's adherence to a Spratly
agreement would enhance the regional goodwill necessary to form
an East Asian trading block.
In addition to economic advantage, goodwill With the claimants
could also enhance China's strategic influence in the region. With
the withdrawal of most of the U.S. and Russian military forces
from South East Asia, China now has an opportfinity to increase
its influence over the policy direction of the region. 147 A peace-
ful Spratly settlement would enhance China's reputation as a good
neighbor and would help China fill the strategic vacuum left by the
United States and Russia.
148
Good relations with the other claimants could also assist China
in refuting charges of human rights violations. One Malaysian
commentator stated, "ASEAN expected China to develop a more
friendly approach towards them ... for ... resisting efforts to
146. Some commentators view agreements with China skeptically because of China's
alleged human rights violations, China's alleged proliferation of weapons technology, and
China's inability to control intellectual property right infringement. None of these
situations, however, should cast doubt on the reliability of a Spratly settlement. Foreign
countries imposed on China the universal human rights notions and the list of countries
barred from receiving weapons technology. Nigel Holloway et al., Going Ballistic, FAR E.
ECON. REV., June 27, 1996, at 14; Ian Johnson, Chinese Military Subverts Policies; Army
Defies U.S., Pressures Taiwan, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 15, 1996, at 1A. On the other hand,
China would take an active part in developing any Spratly settlement and thus would more
likely adhere to its terms. China's difficulty in enforcing its intellectual property law is
mainly due to local governments' disregard for the central government's authority. U.S.
Trade Sanctions-Chinese Comments, Newsbites News Network, Feb. 6, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2205550. A Spratly settlement, however, would avoid this problem
because the central government would administer the agreement directly.
147. During the 1990s, Russia withdrew its forces from Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, and
the United States dramatically reduced its forces in the Philippines. McDorman, supra
note 1, at 270.
148. Id.
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condemn Beijing for its human rights policies."14 9 Thus, goodwill
in South East Asia could help China undermine the charge that it
violates "universal" human rights notions.
2. China's Limited Military Capability
China would likely abide by a Spratly agreement rather than
expropriate the Spratlys' resources because China currently lacks
the military capability to hold the Spratlys.I' °  The other claim-
ants may not even need to directly confront the potential Chinese
forces occupying the Spratlys in order to prevent China from
realizing the Spratlys resources. Indeed, by simply mining the
potential oil drilling sites, the other claimants can effectively
neutralize all oil development. To guard against this possibility,
China would have to maintain a continuous presence in the region
to enforce its claim. Because the Spratlys are far from any Chinese
bases and China's navy has limited blue-water capability,15' such
an ongoing military operation is beyond China's current logistical
capability."5 2 There is also the additional consideration of wheth-
er the potential resource wealth of the Spratlys is sufficient to
justify the enormous cost of building, maintaining, and deploying
a blue-water navy.
153
3. China's Need for Foreign Technology
Because of insufficient technology and capital, China, like the
other claimants, must rely on foreign companies to exploit the
Spratlys' suspected oil wealth.'54 As noted previously, the issue
149. B.A. Hamzah, Cloud of Gloom over the Spratlys, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malaysia),
Jan. 11, 1996, at 9.
150. Maritime Risks and Threats in the Western Pacific, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV.,
Aug. 1, 1995, at 3.
151. Blue-water capability is a country's ability to project its military forces to distant
theaters of operation. This is usually accomplished by operating large numbers of ocean
going warships, supply ships, and transport ships. China has only recently begun to acquire
these types of vessels. Gao, supra note 3, at 348.
152. "[T]he PRC is years away from having the capability to overrun the Spratlys and
then militarily hold them." Eirinberg, supra note 23. The Chinese navy today is largely
a coastal defense force with no aircraft carriers. Bennett, suprq note 2, at 428.
153. "Any significant extension ... of their [Spratly claimants] navies ... in the area
[Spratlys] ... require[s] ... more ... financial investment ... than seems ... sensible."
Maritime Risks and Threats in the Western Pacific, supra note 150.
154. Bennett, supra note 2, at 433. China's fast-developing industries will require
significantly more energy sources. Blanche & Blanche, supra note 4. In the last decade,
China changed from an exporter of oil to a net importer and its dependence on imported
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of sovereignty must be resolved before foreign oil companies will
likely commit to long-term investment. 15 5  While the Spratly
dispute remains outstanding, the political risk would either deter
foreign companies from investing in the Spratlys or would cause
them to exact a high premium for the risk. Either scenario would
burden Chinese economic interests in the Spratlys.
VI. CONCLUSION
The most appropriate solution to the Spratly dispute is an
expedited joint development agreement giving China sovereignty.
This solution is practical because international law favors China's
sovereignty claim, a joint development agreement will promote
regional interests, and China's current domestic situation offers the
other claimants substantial bargaining power.
The resolution of the Spratly dispute through Chinese
sovereignty and joint development may yield significant collateral
benefits to the claimants beyond the direct economic value of the
Spratlys' resources. The direct benefit of resolving the dispute
would be the efficient exploitation of the Spratlys' resource wealth.
The more significant collateral benefit is the synergy the claimants
would create that would enhance their collective modernization
drive.
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oil will likely deepen. Calder, supra note 7.
155. Blanche & Blanche, supra note 4.
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